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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040965-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for illegal possession or use of a controlled 
substance (meth), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Dennis 
M. Fuchs presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Exigent circumstances. When a dozen officers, approaching a suspected drug 
house before dawn in full raid gear and armed with a knock-and-announce warrant, perceived 
that the residents may have been alerted to their approach by a phone call from a passing car, 
did exigent circumstances justify the officers' forcible entry immediately after knocking and 
announcing? 
Standard of review. Whether exigent circumstances justified officers' entry into a 
home is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, 
% 9. The factual findings underlying the district court's decision are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,^ f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The application 
of the legal standard to those facts is reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,^ [ 
12, 103P.3d699. 
2. Suppression. Must the evidence be suppressed where the knock-and-announce 
rule is not "fundamental," the officers did not act in bad faith, and no causal link ties the 
alleged illegality to discovery of the evidence? 
Standard of review. Whether suppression is the appropriate remedy for violations of 
the Fourth Amendment presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Stevens, 
570 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Wis. App. 1997). Whether suppression is the appropriate remedy 
under the Utah suppression statute also presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
See State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST., amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004). Force used in executing 
warrant—When notice of authority is required as a prerequisite. 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is 
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may be 
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-212 (West 2004). Evidence seized pursuant to 
warrant not excluded unless unlawful search or seizure 
substantial—"Substantial" defined 
(1) Property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be 
suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceeding, unless the unlawful conduct of 
the peace officer is shown to be substantial. 
(2) Any unlawful search or seizure shall be considered substantial and in bad 
faith if the warrant was obtained with malicious purpose and without probable 
cause or was executed maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the 
warrant or with unnecessary severity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information dated 15 December 2003 with four counts 
of assault on a peace officer and one count each of disarming a peace officer, unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia: 
Count I Disarming a peace officer , a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004); 
Count II Unlawful possession of a controlled substance , a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 
2004); 
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Count III Assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (West 2004); 
Count IV Assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (West 2004); 
Count V Assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (West 2004); 
Count VI Assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (West 2004); 
Count VII Unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia , a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 
2004). 
R. 3-5. Defendant was bound over on counts one through six only. R. 5, 35-36. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that "officers failed to 
knock and announce their presence and purpose prior to entering the house to search." R. 
59. He also filed a motion to quash the bindover. R. 67-74. After an evidentiary hearing and 
a motion hearing, the district court denied both motions. R. 104-09, 125. 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony. R. 138-39. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years. R. 168. The prison term was suspended and defendant was ordered to serve 365 days 
in jail without credit for time served, and to pay a fine of $1,025. R. 168-70. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 172-73. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Before dawn on 4 December 2003, a dozen officers in "raid gear" or "SWAT gear" 
executed a search warrant at the home of Angela Gallegos in Magna, Utah. R. 200: 6-11,28, 
38; R. 201: 7, 11, 15; R. 216,221.* 
Detective Jason Watkins had obtained the search warrant two days earlier. R. 224-26 
(addendum A). His affidavit states that he has reason to believe that evidence of drug crimes 
would be found, including marijuana, methamphetamine, currency, drug records, and 
firearms. R. 216-17 (addendum A). Mario Cabrera, a former resident of the home reportedly 
selling methamphetamine out of it, had a criminal history including assault, aggravated 
burglary, and resisting an officer. R. 219-21. He also had two active arrest warrants. R. 221. 
The search warrant authorized a search "anytime day or night," but not a no-knock entry. R. 
225-26. 
When the officers were about one house north of the target residence, a car approached 
from the south and started to turn into defendant's driveway; as it did so, its headlights 
illuminated the officers coming up the sidewalk. R. 201: 7-8, 13-14,17. The occupants of 
the car appeared to see the officers and, instead of entering the driveway, they continued 
1
 Although the district court refers several times to "Armijo's home" or "defendant's 
home," R. 99,103; see also R. 122, the references seem inadvertent. The record establishes 
that defendant did not own a home and was residing with his parents in Kearns, Utah at the 
time of his arrest. See R. 19-20. 
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down the street. R. 201: 8, 14, 17. Officer Brent Jex noticed that the car's passenger was 
on the phone. R. 201: 8. He told the other officers, "He is on the phone." R. 201: 8. 
The officer in charge, Sergeant Kevin Matthews, told Detective Mike Ikemiyashiro that 
"there was a light and movement from the home." R. 200: 19. Detective Ikemiyashior 
himself was watching the car drive off. Id. That night, Sergeant Matthews also told 
Detective Watkins that, just after the car drove off, he saw a light come on in the basement 
of the house. R. 201: 19. Sergeant Matthews concluded that the officers had been "burned" 
and that their "approach had been compromised." R. 200: 7-8. That is, "the people in the 
house might have realized that [they] were there to serve a search warrant." R. 200: 20. He 
said, "We are burned. We are burned. Execute." R. 201: 12, 17. 
The officers walked briskly towards the house. R. 200: 9; R. 201: 9, 17. Sergeant 
Matthews knocked loudly on the front door and started yelling out, "Sheriffs office, search 
warrant"; without waiting for the door to be answered, the officers breached the door with 
a ram and entered. R. 200: 9, 20; R. 201: 18, 20. As each officer entered, he or she called 
out, "Police, search warrant." R. 201: 9; R. 200: 9, 21. Detective Watkins, the first officer 
in, entered a main floor bedroom and found a couple of people. R. 201: 18. 
Detective Ikemiyashiro scanned the living room and saw no people or threats. R. 200: 
9. He continued into the kitchen, then made his way to the back of the house, where he and 
Officer Brent Jex noticed a set of stairs leading down to the basement. R. 200: 9; R. 201: 10. 
Detective Ikemiyashiro called out downstairs and, once additional officers arrived, 
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Ikemiyashiro and Jex descended the stairs. R. 200:9; R. 201:10. Once in the basement, they 
saw defendant lying on a mattress on the floor of a small bedroom, apparently asleep. R. 
200: 10-11; R. 201: 10. The detective again yelled, "Police serving a search warrant," but 
defendant did not react. R. 200: 11, 28. Keeping his gun trained on defendant, Detective 
Ikemiyashiro looked around but saw no threats. R. 200: 11. He then kept trying to wake 
defendant by nudging and shouting at him. R. 200: 11-12, 21-22; R. 201: 11. 
When defendant finally awoke, he lunged at Detective Ikemiyashiro and his partner and 
a struggle ensued. R. 200: 11-12. After a vigorous twenty- to thirty-second struggle the 
officers handcuffed defendant. R. 200: 12-14, 23, 30-31, 39. Eventually Detective 
Ikemiyashiro and another officer transported defendant to jail, where jail officers searched 
him. R. 200: 15. In the course of "dumping out papers and whatnot from within his 
pockets," they pulled out a small baggy of methamphetamine. R. 200: 15-17, 21. The bag 
was of a type that could be disposed of quickly. R. 201: 21. 
Defendant was the only person in the basement. R. 201: 15. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Exigent circumstances. The knock-and-announce rule, in both its Fourth Amendment 
and state statutory forms, requires officers serving a knock-and-announce warrant to knock, 
announce their purpose, and wait a reasonable time before entering. Here, the officers 
knocked and announced, but entered without waiting for a response. Their entry was 
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reasonable under both constitutional and statutory law if, as the district court found, they had 
a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances. 
The district court's finding of exigent circumstances is supportable without reference 
to the challenged basement-light testimony. The officers were seen by the occupants of a car 
that began to turn into the home's driveway, but then kept driving. The passenger had a cell 
phone to his ear. Based on these facts alone, the officers could—indeed must—have 
suspected that their approach to the house had been compromised by the passenger warning 
the occupants of the house that a raid was imminent. 
In addition, two of the officers were told by their superior that he had seen a light go on 
in the basement. The district court did not find that the light in fact went on. Rather, it relied 
on the officers' "subjective" understanding of the facts. Read in context, the district court's 
findings indicate merely that it viewed the facts from the point of view of a reasonable 
officer. This is legally correct: officers need not be right in their perceptions, only 
reasonable. These officers acted reasonably. 
However, with or without the fact of the light going on, exigent circumstances existed. 
Suppression. Assuming arguendo that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of 
exigent circumstances to justify their immediate entry, suppression is not the appropriate 
remedy. 
Suppression here is not justified under the Fourth Amendment. After the filing of 
defendant's brief, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case presenting the 
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issue of whether knock-and-announce violations require suppression. Based on existing law 
they do not, because, though "not inconsequential/5 the interests protected by the knock-and-
announce rule are not "fundamental." Moreover, the officers complied with two-thirds of 
the rule, both knocking and announcing. 
Suppression here is not justified under state statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 
2004) requires officers serving a warrant to knock, announce, and wait for a response. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-212 (West 2004) specifies that evidence seized pursuant to a valid search 
warrant may be suppressed only if the warrant was "executed maliciously and willfully 
beyond the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity." The record in this case 
does not establish these predicates. Accordingly, suppression is unjustified. 
Finally, suppression here not justified because no causal link connects the alleged 
illegality to the discovery of the evidence. Defendant's methamphetamine was not 
discovered because, after knocking and announcing, the officers failed to wait for a response. 
It was discovered because the officers obtained and served a valid warrant. Otherwise stated, 
the methamphetamine would inevitably have been discovered once the officers arrived at the 
Gallegos house with a valid warrant and the means to execute it. 
Concerns that applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to knock-and-announce 
violations would emasculate the rule by eliminating its deterrent effect are answered by the 
Utah suppression statute, which permits suppression if police act in bad faith. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
BECAUSE THE OFFICERS REASONABLY SUSPECTED THAT 
THEIR APPROACH TO A REPORTED DRUG HOUSE HAD BEEN 
COMPROMISED, EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED THEIR 
IMMEDIATE ENTRY 
Defendant claims that "the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because 
an objective view of the totality of the circumstances did not support exigent circumstances." 
Br. Aplt. at 9 (underlining and capitalization omitted). He relies on the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and on Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004). See Br. 
Aplt. at 2. He does not rely on the Utah Constitution. Id. 
The knock-and-announce rule is straightforward. "When executing a search warrant, 
an officer must ordinarily give notice of his authority and purpose before entering the 
premises to be searched." State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700,701 (Utah 1988). In addition, officers 
must, after knocking and announcing their purpose, "wait a reasonable time before entry." 
State v. Floor, 2005 UT App 320, \ 8. See also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38 
(2003) (holding that a wait of 15- to 20-seconds reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004) (authorizing entry when, after officer gives "notice 
of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is not admitted with reasonable 
promptness"). 
The rule's history is rooted in common law tradition. The King's Bench articulated the 
rule as early as 1604: 
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[T]he house of everyone is to him as his castle . . . . 
. . . . [But][i]n all cases when the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be not 
open) may break [into] the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other 
execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks 
[into] it, he ought signify the cause of his coming and to make request to open the 
doors. 
. . . [F]or the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking 
[into] of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great 
damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party when no default is in him; for 
perhaps he did not know of the process of which, if he had notice, it is to be 
presumed that he would obey it. 
Semayne's Case, 77 Eng.Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B.1604); see Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 
927,931-32(1995). 
Three basic interests are served by the knock-and-announce rule: "(1) the protection of 
an individual's private activities within his home, (2) the prevention of violence and physical 
injury to both police and occupants which may result from an unannounced police entry, and 
(3) the prevention of property damage resulting from forced entry." Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. 
The knock-and-announce rule is embodied in both the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Utah statutory law. 
Fourth Amendment. "The Fourth Amendment says nothing specific about formalities 
in exercising a warrant's authorization" except insofar as it forbids "unreasonable searches 
and seizures." Banks, 540 U.S. at 524 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV). This "general 
touchstone of reasonableness . . . governs the method of execution of the warrant." United 
States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where 
police broke a single window in executing "no-knock" warrant). Reasonableness is "a 
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function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results 
than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case; it is too hard to invent categories 
without giving short shrift to details that turn out to be important in a given instance, and 
without inflating marginal ones." Banks, 540 U.S. at 36 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 
33, 39 (1996) ("[W]e have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the 
fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry"); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 
(1963) (reasonableness not susceptible to Procrustean application); Go-Bart Importing Co. 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,357 (1931) (no formula for determining reasonableness; each 
case on its own facts and circumstances)). 
The common law knock-and-announce principle now "forms a part of the 
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment" Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929. 
Accordingly, "in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 934 (emphasis added). 
However, "there [is] no rigid rule requiring announcement in all instances." United 
Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 70 (characterizing Wilson). Thus, while the standard generally requires 
the police to announce their intent to search before entering closed premises, the obligation 
could give way "under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence," or "where 
police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance 
notice were given." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936. "It is indisputable that felony drug 
investigations may frequently involve both of these circumstances." Richards v. Wisconsin, 
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520 U.S. 385, 391 (1997) (striking down Wisconsin's blanket exception to the knock-and-
announce rule for felony drug investigations). Nevertheless, the court must determine on a 
case-by-case basis "whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified 
dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement." Id. at 394. 
To justify a "no-knock" entry, "the police must have a reasonable suspicion that 
knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular c ircumstances, w ould b e 
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for 
example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Id. Thus, "if circumstances support a 
reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight 
in." Banks, 540 U.S. at 37. 
In determining reasonable suspicion, courts must look at the totality of the 
circumstances of each case to see whether the officer has a particularized and objective basis 
for his suspicion. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). "This process allows 
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from 
and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an 
untrained person." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). The likelihood of the 
suspected activity "need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." Id. at 274 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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'The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective 
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Banks, 
540 U.S. at 39 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
In Richards, the Supreme Court unanimously determined that the police had reasonable 
suspicion of exigent circumstances. 520 U.S. at 395. There, one plainclothes officer and one 
uniformed officer knocked on Richards's motel room door. Id. at 388. With the chain still 
on the door, Richards cracked it open and saw the uniformed officer. Id. He quickly 
slammed the door; after waiting two or three seconds, the officers began kicking and 
ramming the door to gain entry. Id. They apprehended Richards and found drugsM at 389. 
The Supreme Court concluded that Richards's "apparent recognition of the officers 
combined with the easily disposable nature of the drugs" justified the officers' decision to 
enter without first announcing their presence and authority. Id. at 396. 
State statute. In Utah, the "knock-and-announce" rule is incorporated into Utah Code 
section 77-23-210: 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the warrant 
may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is 
not admitted with reasonable promptness] or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may be 
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (2003) (emphasis added). As under the Fourth Amendment, 
"a showing of exigent circumstances . . . will permit immediate entry." State v. Floor, 2005 
UT App 320, If 13 (upholding search against knock-and-announce challenge). 
Here, the officers here both knocked and announced their purpose before breaching 
Angela Gallegos's door. See R. 200: 9, 20; R. 201: 18, 20. This reduced any potential for 
violence that may have resulted from an unannounced entry, which could lead a home's 
occupants to believe that criminals were breaking in and they had a right to resist. However, 
after knocking and announcing, the officers immediately breached the door. Id. Defendant's 
challenge focuses on this fact. 
A. Evidence exclusive of the basement light established exigent 
circumstances. 
The district court concluded that "it was reasonable for the officers to believe that 
exigent circumstances arose, necessitating their rapid entry into the home for fear of 
destruction of evidence and the safety of the officers." R. 123 (addendum B). This finding 
is supported in the record even without considering testimony that a basement light went on. 
When the officers were about one house north of the target residence, a vehicle 
approached from the south and started to turn into defendant's driveway; as it did so, its 
headlights illuminated the officers coming up the sidewalk. R. 201: 7-8, 13-14, 17. It 
appeared that the occupants of the car saw the officers and, instead of entering the driveway, 
continued down the street. R. 201: 8, 14, 17. Officer Brent Jex noticed that the car's 
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passenger was on the phone. R. 201: 8. Jex told the other officers, "He is on the phone." 
R.201:8. 
These uncontested facts, without more, establish reasonable suspicion of exigent 
circumstances. The fact that a car was about to pull into the driveway of a known drug house 
at a very early hour could cause a reasonable officer to suspect that occupants of the car knew 
the occupants of the house, or had come to purchase drugs at the house, or both. The fact 
that the car's lights illuminated the officers in full SWAT regalia could cause a reasonable 
officer to suspect that the driver and passenger had seen the team and understood that a raid 
on the house was imminent. The fact that the passenger had a phone to his ear could cause 
a reasonable officer to suspect that the passenger was at that moment warning the occupants 
of the house to dispose of the drugs that were the target of the search. Indeed, on these facts, 
it would have been unreasonable not to at least suspect that the officers had lost control of 
the situation. Nothing more is required. 
An exigency exists if full compliance with the knock-and-announce rule "would be 
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for 
example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. Being "burned," 
as Sergeant Matthews put it, creates such an exigency. R. 201: 12, 17. If the occupants of 
a house are alerted to the approach of a SWAT team, the officers lose "the tactical element 
of surprise," thereby increasing the peril they face in executing the warrant. State v. Bamber, 
630 So.2d 1048, 1051 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Charles P. Garcia, The Knock and Announce 
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Rule: A New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 Colum.L.Rev. 685, 
703-05 (1993)). Obviously, knocking and announcing also results in loss of surprise. The 
difference is that knocking and announcing allows the SWAT team to reveal its presence on 
its own terms, in keeping with its tactical plan, after it is poised to seal and search the house. 
In contrast, here, after the officers' cover was blown, their "staging plan was in disarray." 
People v. Murphy, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 293 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2004) (Benke, acting P.J., 
dissenting). They lost the opportunity to set up around the house to prevent occupants from 
fleeing by a back door or side window. Nor were they positioned to hear the familiar toilet 
flush signaling the disposal of drugs. Instead, they were still some 25 feet from the house. 
R.201:13. 
The district court's finding of exigency is thus supportable even without reference to 
the challenged fact that Sergeant Matthews saw a light come on. 
B. The court reasonably relied on testimony that the lead officer saw a 
basement light come on. 
In addition to the facts cited above, the district court relied on hearsay reports of the 
basement light going on: "Several detectives testified that their on scene supervisor, Sergeant 
Mathews, said that as the vehicle drove off he observed a light come on in the basement of 
Defendant's home." R. 122 (addendum B); see also R. 99 (addendum C) ("Officer 
Matthews reported that a light then came on in the basement of Armijo's home."). Defendant 
"does not dispute that Sergeant Mathews csaid' he saw a light come on in the basement but 
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instead disputes that when viewed objectively the weight of the evidence supports that a light 
actually came on." Br. Aplt. at 18. The court properly relied on this factor. 
That the light went on was shown by the hearsay statements of the lead officer on the 
raid, Sergeant Matthews. While Detective Ikemiyashiro was watching the car, Sergeant 
Matthews, told him that "there was a light and movement from the home." R. 200: 19; see 
also R. 200: 8. That night, Sergeant Matthews also told Detective Watkins that just after the 
car drove off, he saw a light come on in the basement of the house. R. 201: 19. 2 When 
Detective Kelly Stephen Smith entered the room where defendant was, he later recalled, the 
room was lit with light coming from the hallway. R. 200: 40-41. When asked whether a 
light fixture or night-light was on in the room, he testified, "it seemed like there was a low-
level light on inside the room, but I can't remember exactly what the lighting was like." R. 
200:40-41. 
No one testified that Sergeant Matthews' report of seeing a light was false. Nor did any 
testimony state, suggest, or imply that Sergeant Matthews was lying. However, some 
testimony did suggest that he was mistaken. The district court was troubled by the fact that 
when the officers entered the basement they found only defendant, and defendant appeared 
to be—indeed Detective Ikemiyashiro believed him to be—asleep. See R. 200:21; R. 203: 
2
 Sergeant Matthews was unavailable to attend the evidentiary hearing, so the 
prosecutor stated, "So we decided to proceed in the matter, to allow the hearsay in." R. 201: 
22. When the court asked, "In other words, basically, if he had testified, he would testify that 
he saw the light come on?" Defense counsel responded, "That's right." Id. 
18 
5. The district court stated, "What troubled me the most was the fact that the light 
supposedly came on in the basement, the person in the basement, they say, was sound asleep. 
In fact, they had trouble waking him up. It does trouble me. It troubles me greatly." R. 203: 
5. What the court said next troubles defendant greatly: "But again, I think I'd have to look 
at it subjectively as they would have seen it under that situation. And I think this court, at 
least, can make a determination that they would have thought that there were exigent 
circumstances and that they needed to go into the home." R. 203: 5. Earlier the court had 
stated, "But I think the court has to make a decision, a subjective decision, or look at it 
subjectively as the peace officer looked at it . . . in this particular situation." R. 203: 3. 
The testimony was not necessarily inconsistent on this point. The light may have been 
turned on by someone in the basement who escaped out a back or side door or back window 
before the officers reached the house, breached the door, secured the main floor, and 
descended to the basement. Or the light may have been on from the outset, but Sergeant 
Matthews noticed it only after the car incident. Or Sergeant Matthews may have seen a 
reflection of the car's headlights in the basement window. Or defendant himself may have 
turned the light on, then feigned sleep when the police arrived. 
Defendant relies heavily on the court's repetition—at least four times—of the word 
"subjectively." R. 203: 3-5. However, read in context the court seems to be saying that it 
must view the facts from the point of view of a reasonable officer. The court states, for 
example, "I have to look at that as subjectively as the officers would look at it." R. 203: 4. 
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The likely reading of this statement is that if, for example, Sergeant Matthews reasonably but 
incorrectly believed he saw a basement light go on, the district court should factor the light 
into the exigency analysis. In this the district court was correct: reasonable suspicion is based 
on the facts as the officer reasonably believed them to be. "Officers can have reasonable, but 
mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause or exigent 
circumstances . . ." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001). 
The presence of the basement light is therefore properly included in the exigency 
analysis. As stated above, however, other facts establish exigent circumstances here to the 
modest level of reasonable suspicion. The basement light is cumulative. 
Where "circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers 
arrive at the door, they may go straight in." Banks, 540 U.S. at 37. The record here 
establishes "a reasonable suspicion of exigency." Their immediate entry was thus justified 
under both the Fourth Amendment and state statute. 
II. 
SUPPRESSION IS NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE THE KNOCK-AND-
ANNOUNCE RULE IS NOT "FUNDAMENTAL," THE OFFICERS DID 
NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH, AND NO CAUSAL LINK TIES THE 
ALLEGED ILLEGALITY TO DISCOVERY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that "[b]ecause the 'knock-and-announce rule' falls within the 
fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, violation of the rule 
requires suppression." Br. Aplt. at 13. On the contrary, even if the district court erred in 
20 
finding that the officers reasonably suspected exigent circumstances, neither federal 
constitutional nor state statutory law requires suppression. 
A. Suppression is not appropriate h ere u nder t he F ourth A mendment 
because the knock-and-announce requirement is not fundamental. 
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether a Fourth Amendment 
knock-and-announce violation requires suppression. In fact, after defendant filed his brief, 
the Court granted certiorari in a case presenting this very question. See Hudson v. Michigan, 
125 S.Ct. 2964 (2005).3 
3
 Petitioner Hudson phrases the question presented as one of "inevitable discovery": 
Does the inevitable discovery doctrine create a per se exception to the 
exclusionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment "knock and 
announce" violation, as the Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court 
have held, or is evidence subject to suppression after such violations, as the 
Sixth and Eight Circuits, the Arkansas Supreme Court, and the Maryland Court 
of Appeals have held? 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2005 WL 856040. Respondent Michigan phrases the question 
as one of "causality": 
Exclusion of evidence is only appropriate when to fail to exclude would put 
the police in a better position than they would have been had the constitutional 
error never occurred. There is no element of causality between a knock-and-
announce violation and the seizure of contraband pursuant to a valid search 
warrant and search of proper scope. Does the Fourth Amendment require the 
exclusion of evidence because of a violation of principles of announcement 
despite a lack of causal connection between any police error and the discovery 
of the contraband? 
Answer of Respondent, 2005 WL 910329. 
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Lower courts are split. The Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court have held 
that the inevitable discovery doctrine creates a per se exception to the exclusionary rule for 
evidence found after a "knock and announce" violation because the police presumably would 
have found the same evidence if they had knocked and announced. See United States v. 
Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1075 (2003); People 
v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 59-62 (Mich. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). 
However, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits and the courts of last resort in Arkansas and 
Maryland have rejected claims that the inevitable discovery doctrine should insulate "knock 
and announce" violations from the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 
978, 984-85 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Mazepinkv. State, 987 S.W.2d 648,657 (Ark.), cert denied, 528 U.S. 927 (1999); State v. 
Lee, 821 A.2d 922, 931-946 (Md. 2003). 
As applied by Utah courts in Fourth Amendment cases, violation of the knock-and-
announce rule does not always require suppression. See State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1988); see also State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403,410 (Utah App. 1994) (declining to adopt a per 
se rule of suppression for violations of rules of criminal procedure) (citing State v. Rowe, 850 
P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992); State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Utah 1987)). The Fourth 
Amendment may require suppression when illegal police conduct implicates a fundamental 
violation of a defendant's rights: "It is only where the violation also implicates fundamental, 
constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced the 
22 
defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate remedy." Ribe, 876 P.2d at 406 (holding 
that, absent exigent circumstances, clear violation of knock-and-announce requirement 
justified suppression) (quoting Rowe, 850 P.2d at 429) (emphasis in original; footnotes 
omitted). Furthermore, "procedural violations in the execution of search warrants do not 
require suppression of the evidence seized." Rowe, 850 P.2d at 429. For example, 
"suppression of the evidence is not justified when an unauthorized no-knock entry is made 
when no one is at home." Buck, 756 P.2d at 702. 
In Buck, police obtained a warrant to search Buck's home, but it did not excuse them 
from the knock-and-announce requirement. Id. at 700. Ten officers forcibly broke into the 
home through both the front and back doors without knocking or announcing their authority. 
Id. at 701. Police found no one at home, but found plentiful drugs. Id. 
The supreme court noted that the knock-and-announce rule is designed to protect three 
interests: (1) privacy, (2) prevention of violence, and (3) prevention of property damage. Id. 
at 701. However, when the premises are unoccupied, the only interest implicated is the third, 
"prevention of property damage, which usually is the least significant interest of the three." 
Id. at 701. T he c ourt concluded t hat" § 7 7-23-10 c ontemplated t hat, a bsent n o-knock 
authority or exigent circumstances, an officer should knock and announce his authority even 
if no one is on the premises." Id. at 702. "Nevertheless, suppression of the evidence is not 
justified when an unauthorized no-knock entry is made when no one is at home." Id. 
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The court found no Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 703. Buck claimed "only that 
the manner of entry was unlawful," and the manner of entry "had nothing to do with the 
extent of the intrusion on defendant's privacy." Id. Significantly, the court noted, "Although 
[the officers'] unannounced entry was not authorized by the warrant, it did not contribute 
appreciably to the invasion of privacy already authorized by the warrant." Id. 
However, defendant here argues that "[w]ith the holdings of Wilson and Richards, the 
United States Supreme Court has clarified that a violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule 
is a fundamental violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." Br. Aplt. at 13 
(citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934, Richards, 520 U.S. at 393). 
Wilson does not establish the knock-and-announce rule as "fundamental." It holds 
merely that the knock-and-announce principle "is an element of the reasonableness inquiry 
under the Fourth Amendment." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. It is "among the factors to be 
considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure." Id. Thus, "in some 
circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment." Id. The Court was careful not to hold "that every entry must be 
preceded by an announcement," and it warned that the Fourth Amendment "should not be 
read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement 
interests." Id. 
Nor does Richards enshrine the knock-and-announce rale as fundamental. It speaks of 
the interests implicated by an unannounced, forcible entry with telling understatement. For 
24 
example, the Court observes that these interests "should not be unduly minimized/' 
Richards, 520 U.S. at 393, n. 5 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court stops short of 
describing these interests as "consequential," preferring instead the measured "not 
inconsequential." Id. 
In sum, neither the United States Supreme Court nor any Utah appellate court has held 
that the interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule are fundamental. 
In keeping with the foregoing caselaw, the district court ruled that "dispensing with the 
knock and announce requirement while serving [defendant] did not implicate his 
fundamental rights." R. 103. The court reasoned that it was not the mode of entry, but the 
entry itself, which defendant does not challenge, that implicated his privacy rights. Id. As 
in Buck, "the officers had the right to forcibly enter if the defendant did not respond to the 
knock in a reasonable time," and "it is likely he would not have responded within a 
reasonable time." Id. Furthermore, "[n]othing in the record attempts to demonstrate either 
that the search would not have occurred but for the failure to knock and announce or that the 
officers intentionally disregarded the rule out of bad faith." Id. 
Here Angela Gallegos's house was not unoccupied. Nevertheless, as ivBuck, only "the 
manner of entry was unlawful," and the manner of entry "had nothing to do with the extent 
of the intrusion on defendant's privacy." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. It is defendant's position 
that he slept through not only Sergeant Matthews's knock on the front door, but also his 
breaking it down. If so, it is difficult to imagine how his fundamental rights were violated. 
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He certainly would not, given an additional 2 0 se conds, have responded to the knock. 
Indeed, the only difference between the actual entry and the entry he claims should have been 
made is that he would have slept 20 seconds longer. 
Accordingly, suppression is not justified under the Fourth Amendment. 
B. Suppression is not appropriate here under state statutory law because 
the officers did not act in bad faith or with unnecessary severity. 
In addition to his Fourth Amendment claim, defendant asserts a claim under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004) (the no-knock statute). See Br. Aplt. at 8. Again, suppression 
is not justified on these facts. 
Section 77-23-210 specifies the knock-and-announce requirement in Utah: 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is 
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may be 
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. 
In addition to defining the knock-and-announce rule in Utah, our Legislature has specified 
when a violation of that statute requires suppression. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-212 (West 
2004) provides that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may be suppressed only if 
the officer's misconduct is substantial and in bad faith: 
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(1) Property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be 
suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceeding, unless the unlawful conduct of 
the peace officer is shown to be substantial. 
(2) Any unlawful search or seizure shall be considered substantial and in bad 
faith if the warrant was obtained with malicious purpose and without probable 
cause or was executed maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the 
warrant or with unnecessary severity. 
§ 77-23-212.4 In the present context, the rule of this section is that challenged evidence may 
be suppressed only if the officer executed the search in bad faith, to wit, "maliciously and 
willfully beyond the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity." Id.5 
The record here does not establish that the officers obtained the search warrant "with 
malicious purpose and without probable cause" or executed it "maliciously and willfully 
beyond the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity." Id. Indeed, they 
indisputably complied with two-thirds of the knock-and-announce rule and dispensed with 
the third requirement only when they believed they had been "burned." At most, defendant 
4
 The predecessor to this statute appeared at Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(g) (1982). 
This provision, known as the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, was held to violate the 
Fourth Amendment in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,186 (Utah 1987). The supreme court 
held that by in effect creating a good faith exception to investigatory stops and searches, the 
Act exceeded the limits of the exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The State here does not contend that Fourth Amendment 
analysis is controlled in any degree by state statute or common law. 
5
 Although section 77-23-212 was not argued in the district court, it is well settled that 
an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from "if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that 
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such 
ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower 
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 
30, f 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,f 10, 52 P.3d 1158). 
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has shown that, based on the facts available to the officers at the time, their suspicion that 
their cover had been blown was less than reasonable. Accordingly, suppression is not 
justified under state statutory law. 
This result is consonant with Buck. In addition to his Fourth Amendment claim, Buck 
sought suppression of the evidence under section 77-23-210 based on the fact that officers 
forcibly broke into his unoccupied residence. Buck, 756 P.2d at 702. The court agreed that 
the officers violated the statute, but refused the remedy of suppression: while the statute 
"contemplated that, absent no-knock authority or exigent circumstances, an officer should 
knock and announce his authority even if no one is on the premises," nevertheless, 
"suppression of the evidence is not justified when an unauthorized no-knock entry is made 
when no one is home." Id. 
Likewise here, even if the officers violated the Utah no-knock statute, suppression is 
not justified. 
C. Suppression is not appropriate here because the challenged evidence is 
not the fruit of the alleged illegality. 
Even if it were otherwise an appropriate remedy, suppression is not justified where, as 
here, there is no causal relationship between the alleged police illegality and the discovery 
of the challenged evidence. 
"The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative 
(the 'fruit of unlawful police conduct5), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional 
and statutory rights." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,^ f 13, 76 P.3d 1159 (citation omitted). 
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Thus, after finding a Fourth Amendment violation, the court must determine whether there 
was "sufficient causal relationship" between the violation and the discovery of the evidence 
to justify suppression. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 72 n.3 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 
(1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). 
A "but-for" relationship, though necessary, is insufficient. "In cases involving the 
admissibility of evidence obtained as a consequence of police misconduct, the United States 
Supreme Court has eschewed a 'but for' test." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 
1990). In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963), the Supreme Court 
declined to hold "that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not 
have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police." 
Here, no "causal relationship"—not even a but-for relationship—exists between the 
manner of entry and the discovery of defendant's methamphetamine. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 
72 n.3. Defendant does not allege and cannot demonstrate that but for the officers' failure 
to wait 20 seconds before breaching the door, his meth would not have been discovered. 
Certainly defendant would not have answered the door. We may speculate that the occupants 
of the upstairs bedroom might have done so. But whether the officers entered immediately 
after knocking and announcing, or 20 seconds later, defendant's meth was going to be 
discovered. As in Buck, "the manner of entry in this case had nothing to do with the extent 
of the intrusion on defendant's privacy." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. Accordingly, the most 
rudimentary prerequisite for suppression under any standard is absent here. 
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Moreover, even if suppression were otherwise an appropriate remedy, it is not justified 
where, as here, the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.6 
'The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative 
(the 'fruit of unlawful police conduct5), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional 
and statutory rights." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,f 13 (quoting Nix 467 U.S. at 444). The 
principal purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. Id. However, 
the inevitable discovery doctrine "enables courts to look to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and asks whether the police would have 
discovered the evidence despite the illegality." Id. at | 14. Central to this doctrine is the 
belief "that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest 
in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting 
the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error 
or misconduct had occurred." Id. at f^ 13 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443). 
6
 Although inevitable discovery was not argued in the district court, it is well settled 
that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from "if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs 
from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even 
though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised 
in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." State v. 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,lj 10, 52 
P.3d 1158). 
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In Utah, "'an entirely independent, alternate, intervening, appreciably attenuated 
investigation aside from the tainted investigation/ is not required to prove inevitable 
discovery."/</. at If 15 (quoting State v. James, 2000 UT 80,H \ 15-16, 13 P.3d 576). 
The analysis must, of course, "begin with the premise that the challenged evidence is 
in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity." Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted). As noted above, that premise is absent here. In any event, mere 
causation "does not end the inquiry." Id. "If the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the [evidence] ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the 
evidence should be received.5" Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^  14 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444). 
"Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense." Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. 
There will be instances where, based on the historical facts, inevitability is 
demonstrated in such a compelling way that operation of the exclusionary rule is 
a mechanical and entirely unrealistic bar, preventing the trier of fact from learning 
what would have come to light in any case. In such cases, the inevitable discovery 
doctrine will permit introduction of the evidence, whether or not two independent 
investigations were in progress. 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 15 (quoting United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864 (9th 
Cir.1987)). 
Where the purportedly illegality is the failure to wait after knocking and announcing, 
and the evidence is seized pursuant to a valid warrant, the evidence comes not by exploitation 
of the illegality, but by a means—the warrant—free of any taint that would require exclusion. 
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See State v. Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37, f 10, 65 P.3d 314 (holding that related independent 
source doctrine can apply where there is a violation of a knock-and-announce warrant). 
In this case, the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. The police had a 
valid warrant that allowed them to search Angela Gallegos's house. They arrived at the front 
door, knocked, announced their purpose, breached the door, and executed the warrant. This 
search would have taken place regardless of the number of seconds the officers waited on the 
doorstep. The only sense in which the failure to wait longer might have "caused" the 
discovery is by giving defendant time to destroy his meth. But this is not a proper 
consideration. "Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence." Ker 
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963) (plurality opinion) (quoting People v. Maddox, 294 
P.2d 6,9 (Cal. 1956), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 858); accord Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 
796, 816 (1984). In any event, defendant was sleeping, or pretending to sleep, and thus not 
in a position to destroy any evidence. 
Unlike Topanotes, the instant case presents a "compelling scenario . . . for discovery of 
the evidence in question." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, \ 21. The State's inevitable discovery 
argument failed in Topanotes because it rested upon the assumption that "because Topanotes 
was cooperative during the unlawful investigatory stop that did occur, she would have been 
equally cooperative during the hypothetical, legal investigatory stop that would have 
occurred." Id. at f 20. The supreme court observed that "[cjases that rely upon individual 
behavior as a crucial link in the inevitable discovery chain, particularly when that behavior 
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is heavily influenced by the illegality that did occur, rarely sustain an inevitable discovery 
theory." Id. 
In contrast, there is nothing hypothetical about what would have happened here absent 
the alleged illegality. A dozen police in SWAP gear were at Angela Gallegos's front door. 
After knocking and announcing, they forcibly entered. Had they waited 20 seconds, either 
the upstairs occupants would have let them in, or not. Had they been let in, the officers 
would have entered and executed the search warrant. Had they not been let in, the officers 
would have breached the door and executed the search warrant. In either event, armed with 
a valid warrant, their momentum was irreversible. Indeed, "it is hard to understand how the 
discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but inevitable once the police arrive 
with a warrant." Langford, 314 F.3d at 894 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Application of the exclusionary rule here would be "a mechanical and entirely 
unrealistic bar, preventing the trier of fact from learning what would have come to light in 
any case." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, If 15 (quoting Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864). It would 
violate the principle that police should be placed "cin the same, not a worse, position [than] 
they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.'" Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 433). 
While deterrence of police misconduct is a laudable goal, without the inevitable 
discovery rule uthe exclusionary remedy would overdeter." Langford, 314 F.3d at 895. 
Here, "whatever deterrent value may result from suppression in this case is greatly 
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outweighed by society's interest in placing all relevant evidence before the jury." State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1274 (Utah 1993) (holding that defendant's consent to search was 
sufficiently attenuated from knock-and-announce violation to defeat defendant's claim that 
evidence found in search should be excluded). In any event, "[t]here are both state and 
federal sanctions for such violations that serve as deterrents for police misconduct that are 
less severe than the exclusion of the evidence." People v. Stevens, 597 NW.2d 53,64 (Mich. 
1999). 
Finally, Utah's suppression statute should blunt concerns that application of the 
inevitable discovery rule "would completely emasculate the knock-and-announce rule." 
United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978,986 (6th Cir. 2000). Where suppression is sought under 
state law, section 77-23-212 could be read to authorize suppression of all evidence obtained 
pursuant to a warrant "executed maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the warrant 
or with unnecessary severity." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[OJral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
% 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). In the case 
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at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. 
P. 29(a)(3). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on £ August 2005. 
MARX L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
ERIC VOROS, JR 
istant Attorney General 
f, Appeals Division 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this /5^August 2 005, y copies of the foregoing brief of 
appellee were • hand-delivered to an agent of Mmailed to the following: 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 450 South State Street 
MAGISTRATE ADDRESS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
The undersigned Affiant, Jason Watkins, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That your Affiant has reason to believe: 
That on the person of Gallegos, Angela Misty Marie, D.O.B. 06-13-1979, hispanic 
female, 5'5,1201bs, brown hair, brown eyes 
And on the person of Thomas, Random, D.O.B. 12-07-1981, white female, 5'6, 
120 lbs, brown hair, blue eyes. 
And on the person of Cabrera, Mario A., D.O.B. 11-07-1975, hispanic male, 5'4, 
1601bs, black hair, black eyes. 
And on the premises known as 2843 South 8700 West, a single family dwelling, 
described as sitting on the East side of the street, facing West, and having 
yellow siding, and a greenish gray roof. The front door is located on a raised 
porch, faces West, and is white in color. The house numbers 2843 are located on 
the steps leading up to the front door. To include all rooms, attics, basements, and 
other parts therein, the surrounding grounds, storage rooms, storage areas, trash 
containers, vehicles, and outbuildings of any kind located thereon. 
And on all persons who are in the address sought to be searched at the time of the 
Warrant. 
In the city of Magna, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
1. Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the 
possession or distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring 
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devices; and drug paraphernalia described as rolling papers, pipes, or other 
devices used for smoking marijuana. 
2. Methamphetamine; a white crystalline substance in powder, solid or rock 
form, a Schedule II controlled substance or any other illegal narcotics. 
3. Paraphernalia; to include but not limited to pipes, plastic bags, scales, and 
other items commonly used to package drugs or to introduce drugs into the 
human body. 
4. Residency papers; to include but not limited to utility receipts and/or bills, 
rental/lease agreements, and articles showing occupancy of the premises. 
5. United States currency believed to be in close proximity to the narcotics 
being searched for, and any and all items determined to be collateral or 
proceeds from narcotics transactions. 
6. Narcotics records; to include but not limited to price lists, amounts sold, 
times, dates, amounts purchased, who purchased, financial gain, and drug 
indebtedness. 
7. Firearms; to include but not being limited to pistols, revolvers, rifles, semi 
or fully automatic weapons determined to be proceeds of narcotics 
transactions or used to protect narcotics activities. 
8. And any other item(s) determined to be fruits or instrumentalities of the 
crime(s) of Possession and Distribution of a Controlled Substance. 
and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or 
concealing a public offense, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a 
party to the illegal conduct. 
Furthermore your Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence 
ofthecrime(s) of 
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Possession and Distribution of a Controlled Substance. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
Your Affiant, Detective Jason B. Watkins, is currently employed by the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office, Special Investigations Division. Your Affiant has been 
given the responsibility to investigate complaints occurring in Salt Lake County on drug 
related criminal matters. 
Your Affiant has had training in controlled substance(s) identification and 
investigation of controlled substance related offenses. Your Affiant is a Certified Peace 
Officer in the State of Utah, and has Keen employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office for six (6) years. Your Affiant has graduated from the Utah Police Officer 
Standards and Training Academy. 
Your Affiant's specialized training includes drug identification and recognition 
courses taught by the Utah Peace Officers Standard and Training and the Police 
Academy. Your Affiant has attended and completed a clandestine laboratory 
certification course taught by experts in the field. Your Affiant has received a 
certification to investigate clandestine laboratories and associated crimes involving the 
production/extraction of the associated precursor chemicals. 
Your Affiant has attended and completed a marijuana grow and investigations 
class sponsored by the United States Military. Your Affiant has also attended and 
completed an eighty (80) hour drug investigation course sponsored by The Rocky 
Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. (H.I.D.T.A.) 
Your Affiant has made numerous drug related arrests involving the seizure of 
controlled substances and interviewing suspects. 
Your Affiant has investigated narcotic cases through trash covers, surveillance of 
suspected drug sales operations, confidential informant controlled buys, interrogation of 
suspects, and investigating intelligence reports received by citizens. 
Your Affiant is currently investigating a complaint relating to the distribution of 
a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine at the named premises on this 
Warrant/Affidavit. 
Your Affiant was able to articulate the following information and verify it through 
personal observation: 
Within the last thirty five(35) days, Detective John Wester received information 
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from a concerned citizen that illegal narcotics activity was taking place at the residence 
sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. During the last twenty (20) days, the 
same concerned citizen, said a person by the name of Mario, was selling 
methamphetamine from the residence sought to be searched. 
On November 7,2003, your Affiant conducted a trash cover on the residence 
sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. Your Affiant met with the driver of the 
waste removal truck who is responsible for the trash pick up in this area. Your Affiant 
checked the hopper area of the truck and it was seen to be empty. Your Affiant 
accompanied the driver to the address sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit 
and observed as the contents of the trash can, located on the curbside in front of the 
address sought to be searched, were emptied into the hopper area of the waste removal 
truck. 
Your Affiant searched the contents of the trash and found thirteen (13) plastic 
baggies that your Affiant knows illegal narcotics are commonly packaged in. In one of 
the baggies, Your Affiant saw residue and seeds that in your Affiants experience 
appeared to be marijuana residue and seeds. Your Affiant field tested the substance and 
it field tested positive for marijuana. Your Affiant also found 5 twist type packaging 
material that in your Affiants training and experience illegal narcotics are commonly 
packaged in. Your Affiant knows through training and experience that the items found 
are associated with drug possession and or distribution. 
Within the last eighteen (18) days, your Affiant conducted at trash cover at the 
residence sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. Your Affiant met with the 
driver of the waste removal truck who is responsible for the trash pick up in this area. 
Your Affiant checked the hopper area of the truck and it was seen to be empty. Your 
Affiant accompanied the driver to the address sought to be searched by this 
Warrant/Affidavit and observed as the contents of the trash can, located on the curbside 
in front of the address sought to be searched, were emptied into the hopper area of the 
waste removal truck. 
Your Affiant searched the contents of the trash and found a homemade marijuana 
pipe made of tin foil. This pipe had the odor of marijuana and your Affiant field tested 
residue in the pipe and it field tested positive for marijuana. Your Affiant also found a 
broken glass pipe that methamphetamine is commonly smoked in. Your Affiant also 
found six (6) partial corners to plastic bags that had been cut off. Your Affiant knows 
from training and experience that narcotics are commonly packaged this way. Your 
Affiant saw residue on one of these plastic corners and your Affiant field tested the 
residue on the plastic and it field tested positive for methamphetamine. Your Affiant also 
found three (3) plastic bags and three (3) partial plastic bags. Your Affiant also found 
four (4) plastic, twist type packaging materials. Your Affiant knows through training 
and experience that the items found are consistent with illegal drug activity. 
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Within the last three (3) days, your Affiant conducted at trash cover at the 
residence sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. Your Affiant met with the 
driver of the waste removal truck who is responsible for the trash pick up in this area. 
Your Affiant checked the hopper area of the truck and it was seen to be empty. Your 
Affiant accompanied the driver to the address sought to be searched by this 
Warrant/Affidavit and observed as the contents of the trash can, located on the curbside 
in front of the address sought to be searched, were emptied into the hopper area of the 
waste removal truck. 
Your Affiant searched the contents of the trash and found four (4) twist type 
baggies, two (2) similar baggies and one of these had the corner of the bag cut off. Your 
Affiant also found two (2) other baggies and one (1) large baggie. Your Affiant also 
found two (2) small baggies that methamphetamine is commonly packaged in. Your 
Affiant saw residue on one of these plastic baggies and your Affiant field tested the 
residue and it field tested positive for methamphetamine. Your Affiant knows from 
training and experience that the items found are consistent with illegal drug activity. 
Your Affiant also found residency documents with the address sought to be searched by 
this Warrant/Affidavit 
During the last twenty five (25) days your Affiant has held surveillance at the 
address sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. Your Affiant has seen vehicles 
at the residence sought to be searched, and using the State of Utah maintained databases 
your Affiant discovered that one of the registered owners of one of these vehicles has a 
drug related arrest. The arrest was for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Your Affiant considers the information received from the concerned citizen(s) 
reliable because: The concerned citizen(s) has placed him/herself at great personal risk by 
providing assistance and information to law enforcement. The concerned citizen(s) 
provided your Affiant with the location of the residence sought to be searched by this 
Warrant/Affidavit, The concerned citizen(s) has not been promised anything in return for 
the information provided. This address was verified using the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office resources. The concerned citizen was not in custody at the time the information 
was given to your Affiant. 
The concerned citizen(s) revealed this information to Detective Wester with the 
understanding that their identities would not be revealed. Your Affiant requests that the 
concerned citizen remain confidential: 1) Disclosure of the identity of the informants) 
would endanger the safety and well being of the informant(s). 2) Disclosure would 
destroy the informant(s) usefulness to law enforcement. Your Affiant asks the court not 
to reveal the identity of the informant(s) for fear of physical retaliation by the suspects 
involved in this case or by any of their criminal associates. Threats of physical harm 
against individuals who are thought to be police informants are commonplace. 
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Using the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office report system and The State of Utah 
databases your Affiant conducted a records check on Angela Gallegos. It was found that 
Angela has a Utah drivers license with the address sought to be searched by this 
Warrant/Affidavit listed as her home address. A utilities check also confirmed that the 
utilities are in Angela's name. Angela has no criminal history. 
On November 5,2003, The State of Utah Division of Child and Family Services 
was contacted by a concerned citizen, who was concerned about Santanna Sickler, who 
is Angelas's five year old child. Your Affiant reviewed this complaint and the complaint 
states that the mother is smoking methamphetamine in the house. The concerned citizen 
also states that glass pipes have been found in the home and the pipes have been hidden 
where the child would not find them. The complaint also alleges Angela cannot pass a 
drug test. 
Within the last nineteen (19) days your Affiant also contacted a State of Utah, 
Division of Child and Family Services case worker. This case worker told your Affiant 
she has had conversations with Angela Gallegos within the last twenty two (22) days and 
Angela admitted to her that she uses marijuana in the home, but not around the child. 
Your Affiant was also told by this case worker, that Randon Thomas lives at the 
residence sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit with her boyfriend, Mario 
Cruz. This case worker also told your Affiant that she was told that Mario Cabrera used 
to live at the residence sought to be searched but he had moved out. The case worker told 
your Affiant that she was told Mario Cabrera still frequents the residence. 
Your Affiant conducted a history check of calls made to, or action taken by the 
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office concerning the address sought to be searched by this 
Warrant/Affidavit. It was found that Angela Gallegos has made several calls from the 
address sought to be searched, and this same address has been listed as her home address 
in the reports. Using The Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office report system your Affiant 
found that Angela Gallegos had been involved in a domestic dispute with her father Able 
Gallegos. Able told deputies one of the reasons he and Angela had been fighting was 
because his ex-wife had found a glass pipe, like the kind commonly used to smoke crack 
or methamphetamine, in Angela's purse. This report was taken July 1, 2003 and was 
reported to the Sheriffs office under case number 03-76130. 
Using The State of Utah maintained databases, your Affiant conducted a criminal 
history check on Mario Cabrera. Mario has a criminal history of Assault, Possession of a 
Controlled Substance Marijuana with Intent To Distribute, Possession of Narcotic 
Equipment, Aggravated Burglary, Resisting an Officer, Driving Under the Influence, and 
Disorderly Conduct. Mario has a Utah drivers license but it has been suspended due to 
drugs. Mario currently has two active arrest warrants, one for speeding and one for 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled/counterfeit substance. 
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Using the State of Utah maintained databases your Affiant also discovered that 
Randon Thomas has a criminal record that includes an arrest for Uttering a 
Forged/Altered prescription and Failure to Comply. 
Through your Affiant's training and experience it is known that packaging 
material, cutting materials, scales, documents showing residency, evidence of distribution 
of controlled substances, and U.S. currency are found where narcotics trafficking is 
taking place and maintained on the named premises. 
Your Affiant desires to search the persons who may be at the address sought to be 
searched by this Warrant/Affidavit at the time of the Warrant service. Your Affiant 
knows from training and experience that residences such as these that are involved in the 
use, manufacture, or distribution of narcotics often are used as "flop houses" by the 
persons who are found inside. Your Affiant knows from training and experience, that 
persons inside are commonly there to purchase or use narcotics and will often have 
narcotics and or paraphernalia hidden on their person. 
Your Affiant has had this Warrant/Affidavit reviewed by Deputy District 
Attorney: ^ ^ Ml o (— C^Mc^Cand the Warrant/Affidavit has been approved for 
presentation t6 the court. 
WHEREFORE, your Affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said 
items at any time day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize 
the property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good 
reason to wit: 
The cover of darkness would enhance an undetected approach to the residence 
without endangering the safety of police officers or innocent uninvolved parties. It also 
aids in defeating counter surveillance techniques used by illegal narcotic distributors. 
The cover of darkness would enhance the ability to approach and enter the residence 
while reducing the possibility to retrieve a weapon or arm any explosive device or trap to 
defeat law enforcement Furthermore the address sought to be searched on this 
Warrant/Affidavit is located in a residential neighborhood. Service of the search warrant 
during the hours of darkness will insure the safety of neighbors, occupants of the address 
sought to be searched, and other involved parties due to their presence in the area being 
limited during those hours. 
{fopetfi B. Watkins 
Affiant 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^ day ofUouenber, 2003. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Jason Watkins, I 
am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That your Affiant has reason to believe: 
That on the person of Gallegos, Angela Misty Marie, D.O.B. 06-13-1979, hispanic 
female, 5'5,1201bs, brown hair, brown eyes 
And on the person of Thomas, Randon, D.O.B. 12-07-1981, white female, 5'6, 
1201bs, brown hair, blue eyes. 
And on the person of Cabrera, Mario A., D.O.B. 11-07-1975, hispanic male, 5'4, 
1601bs, black hair, black eyes. 
And on the premises known as 2843 South 8700 West, a single family dwelling, 
described as sitting on the East side of the street, facing West, and having 
yellow siding, and a greenish gray roof. The front door is located on a raised 
porch, faces West, and is white in color. The house numbers 2843 are located on 
the steps leading up to the front door. To include all rooms, attics, basements, and 
other parts therein, the surrounding grounds, storage rooms, storage areas, trash 
containers, vehicles, and outbuildings of any kind located thereon. 
And on all persons who are in the address sought to be searched at the time of the 
Warrant 
In the city of Magna, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
1. Marijuana, farther described as a green leafy substance; material related to 
the possession or distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, 
measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia described as rolling papers, 
pipes, or other devices used for smoking marijuana. 
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2. Methamphetamine; a white crystalline substance in powder, solid or rock 
form, a Schedule II controlled substance or any other illegal narcotics. 
3. Paraphernalia; to include but not limited to pipes, plastic bags, scales, and 
other items commonly used to package drugs or to introduce drugs into the 
human body. 
4. Residency papers; to include but not limited to utility receipts and/or bills, 
rental/lease agreements, and articles showing occupancy of the premises. 
5. United States currency believed to be in close proximity to the narcotics 
being searched for, and any and all items determined to be collateral or 
proceeds from narcotics transactions. 
6. Narcotics records; to include but not limited to price lists, amounts sold, 
times, dates, amounts purchased, who purchased, financial gain, and drug 
indebtedness. 
7. Firearms; to include but not being limited to pistols, revolvers, rifles, semi 
or fully automatic weapons determined to be proceeds of narcotics 
transactions or used to protect narcotics activities. 
8. And any other item(s) determined to be fruits or instrumentalities of the 
crime(s) of Possession and Distribution of a Controlled Substance. 
and that said property or evidence: 
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or 
concealing a public offense, or 
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a 
party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded 
at anytime day or night, good cause having been shown 
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to make a search of the above-named or described person(s) and premises to 
include all rooms, attics, basements, and other parts therein, the surrounding 
grounds, storage rooms, storage areas, trash containers, vehicles, and outbuildings 
of any kind located thereon for the herein-above described property or evidence 
and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or 
retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated t h i s _ _ 2 = d a y of NweiBber^OIB. 
Addendum B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
BYRON F. BURMESTER, Bar No. 6844 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
PILED DISTRICT C0DKT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 12 2004 
SALT LAKE 
•jf— Deputy CisrK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 031908515 FS 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for hearing and 
determination of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, on Junell, 15, and 17, 
2004. The Defendant was represented by Ralph Dellapiana. The State was represented 
by Byron F. Burmester, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. Based upon the 
testimony of Detectives Brent Jex and Jason Watkins, and the Preliminary Hearing 
testimony of Detective Mike Ikemiyashiro, and Sergeant Mathews, memoranda, and the 
arguments presented by counsel, and for good cause shown, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 4, 2003, Salt Lake County police officers served a search 
warrant at the Defendant's place of residence, 2843 South 8700 West. 
2. The search warrant provided for a knock and announce search during day or 
nighttime hours. 
3. The officers were dressed in helmets, vests, and clearly marked uniforms. 
4. As the officers approached the residence, just before sunrise, an unknown 
vehicle began to turn into Defendant's driveway, and in doing so, its 
headlights illuminated the officers approaching the home. 
5. After illuminating the officers, the car quickly drove back out onto the street 
and continued past the officers. 
6. At that time, Detective Jex observed a passenger in the car talking on a cell 
phone as the vehicle reversed and left the premises. 
7. Several detectives testified that their on scene supervisor, Sergeant Mathews, 
said that as the vehicle drove off he observed a light come on in the basement 
of Defendant's home. 
8. Sergeant Mathews communicated to the team, based on all of the 
observations, that he thought they had been "burned" and their search was 
compromised. 
9. The officers were one residence away when the car noticed them, and they 
took approximately another 10 seconds to reach the porch of the house. 
10. Based on this assessment, the officers continued to approach Defendant's 
residence, but abandoned the knock and announce protocol, and knocked 
whiling forcing entry into the home and announcing their presence and 
purpose. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Police officers may abandon knock and announce procedures if exigent 
circumstances warrant a reasonable concern that: (1) evidence will be 
destroyed, or (2) the officers' safety (or the safety of another) is at risk. 
2. To determine if exigent circumstances existed in this case, the Court looked 
subjectively through the eyes of the officers at the scene to assess the specific 
facts of this case. 
3. Based on the vehicle illuminating the officers as they approached the home; 
the testimony that it appeared as if a passenger in the vehicle was on a cell 
phone; and the officer's testimony that Sergeant Mathews's saw a light come 
on in the basement after the vehicle left the driveway, the Court concludes it 
was reasonable for the officers to believe that exigent circumstances arose, 
necessitating their rapid entry into the home for fear of destruction of evidence 
and the safety of the officers. 
Based upon the evidence offered by the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the 
supporting memoranda, the Court denies the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
DATED this & day ofjjiae; 2004. 
BY THE C 
Read and Approved as to Form: 
Ralph Dellapiatia ' ' 
Attorney for Defendant 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
BYRON F. BURMESTER, Bar No. 6844 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
PAUL ANTHONY ARMUO, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 031908515 FS 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
2. A hearing is set for July 12,2004, at 8:30 a.m. 
Ju-K 
DATED this /£ day of-Jttee, 2004 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon. BJeppisJ.VL. j?m;ns> I 
DistrictC6]arYJudge/ "t f 
V 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND DECISION ON 
DEFENDANT ARMIJO'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Civil No. 031908515 FS 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs 
[^1 Before the Court is Defendant Paul Anthony Armijo's ("Armijo" or "defendant") Motion 
to Suppress evidence. Based on the record, and after review of the applicable law, the Court 
finds for the plaintiff and denies the Motion to Suppress evidence. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
\2 On December 4, 2003, Salt Lake County police officers served a search warrant at 2834 
South 8700 West. Judge Quinn had signed the warrant that allowed for day or nighttime search 
but mandated a knock-and-announce procedure. The officers served the warrant at about five to 
six o'clock in the morning. 
T[3 As the officers approached the residence a vehicle pulled into the driveway. The 
headlights from the vehicle illuminated the officers outside of the home. The vehicle then 
immediately left the premises. Officer Matthews reported that a light then came on in the 
basement of Armijo's home. 
Tf4 The officers continued to approach the home. Upon reaching the front door, officers 
knocked and announced their presence and intent but forcefully entered the home without 
waiting for a response. Officers testified they entered the home without waiting because they felt 
that the driver of the car that entered the drive way may have informed the defendant of their 
presence and the defendant could destroy evidence before they entered the home. Once inside, 
the officers began searching the home, announcing their presence and intent multiple times. The 
officers found the defendant apparently asleep and unresponsive in the basement. 
\5 After waking the defendant, a scuffle ensued. Eventually Armijo was taken into custody 
and the search yielded drugs (specifically, methamphetamine) and drug paraphernalia. The 
question before the court is whether the evidence in the search should be suppressed when the 
officers serving the warrant dispensed with the required knock and announce procedure. 
ANALYSIS 
T[6 The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the "right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated." U.S. Const, amend. IV. Under Utah statute police serving a search warrant shall give 
notice of their authority and purpose before entering the house except when the magistrate 
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. Utah Code 
Annotated § 77-23-210 (2003). The Supreme Court has held that the knock and announce 
principle forms part of the reasonableness inquiry, obligating law enforcement to wait a 
reasonable time after notifying the occupants of the home of their presence before forcibly 
entering the home. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995). However, opting for a case-
by-case analysis instead of a rigid bright-line rule of reasonableness, the Supreme Court has held 
that exigent circumstances may except an officer's not waiting to enter a residence after 
announcing his or her presence. U.S. v. Banks, 124 S.Ct. 521, 525 (2003); Richards v. 
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). The Supreme Court held that police must have a 
"reasonable suspicion" of exigent circumstances to justify dispensing with the knock and 
announce requirement when serving a search warrant. Id. 
\1 In Wilson v. Arkansas the Supreme Court heard the case in which a police informant 
made multiple drug purchases from the defendant, Sharlene Wilson. 514 U.S. 927. On 
December 30, 1992 the defendant threatened the informant with an automatic pistol. Acting on 
evidence and testimony of the informant, police officers secured a search warrant for the 
defendant's home the next day and served the warrant the same day. Id. at 929. Because of the 
defendant's violent criminal past and threats to the informant, officers dispensed with the knock 
and announce requirement before entering the home; the defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence collected in the search. Id. The Supreme Court held that the knock and announce 
principle is part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry and that failure to knock and 
announce may make a search unreasonable "in some circumstances". Id. at 934. The Court 
stated that judges should consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether exigent 
circumstances and countervailing interests of law enforcement justify a failure to knock and 
announce. Id. at 935. Specifically, the Court stated, "unannounced entry may be justified where 
police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice 
were given." Id. At 936. 
T[8 In Richards v. Wisconsin the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction when 
police did not knock and announce before serving a warrant to search the defendant's hotel 
room. 520 U.S. 385. While officers had duly requested a warrant that allowed them to enter 
without announcing their authority and purpose, the magistrate did not grant the request. Id. at 
388. Officers arrived on the scene in plain clothes (one officer was in uniform) and originally 
announced themselves to be maintenance workers. Id. When the defendant opened the door, 
with a chain lock still engaged, he saw the officer in uniform and shut the door. Id. The officers 
then forcibly entered the hotel room and apprehended the defendant as he tried to exit through 
the bathroom window. Id. The Court held that "in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted 
with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry 
justified dispensing with the knock-and- announce requirement." Id. at 394. The Court then 
went on to say that u[i]n order to justify a cno-knock' entry, the police must have a reasonable 
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, 
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, 
for example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Id. 
%9 In U.S. v. Banks the Supreme Court overturned a Ninth Circuit Court, U.S. v. Banks, 282 
F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2002), decision to suppress evidence because waiting fifteen to twenty 
seconds after knocking and announcing was an unreasonable amount of time. 124 S.Ct. 521. 
Police, serving a search warrant at two o'clock in the afternoon, knocked on the defendant's door 
and announced their authority and purpose loudly enough to be heard by officers in the back of 
the house. Id. at 523. After waiting fifteen to twenty seconds with no response officers forcibly 
entered the house; the defendant had been in the shower and claimed not to have heard the 
officers' knocking. Id. The Court, in overturning the Ninth Circuit, said, "we have treated 
reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce 
sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case." Id. at 525. Instead 
of a bright line rule or list of acceptable exceptions, the Court determined that, even when a 
warrant requires a knock and announce procedure, "if circumstances support a reasonable 
suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight in ... it is enough 
to say that the facts known to the police are what count in judging reasonable waiting time." Id. 
at 525, 527. 
[^9 The Supreme Court precedent establishes that the procedural aspects of serving a warrant 
fall under the reasonable inquiry of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court has recognized 
that exigent circumstances and legitimate interests of law enforcement may justify dispensing 
with the knock and announce requirement. In addition, the Court has refused to establish a 
bright line rule as to when the requirement can be done away with. Instead, the Court says 
judges should consider the totality of the circumstances and that law enforcement officers must 
only demonstrate a "reasonable suspicion" that announcing their presence prior to entering 
would frustrate a legitimate law enforcement purpose. 
TJ10 In the Armijo's case officers were serving a warrant that required them to knock and 
announce their authority and purpose and to wait a reasonable amount of time before entering the 
residence. While approaching the house the officers were discovered by an unidentified car 
pulling into the defendant's driveway. Shortly after the car pulled away Sergeant Matthews 
reported seeing a light go on in the basement. Each officer testified that they believed they might 
have been revealed by the driver of the car to the occupant of the home. The officers reasoned 
that the occupant of the home could easily and quickly destroy crucial drug evidence. In light of 
exigent circumstances officers decided to dispense with the knock and announce requirement of 
the warrant. They forcibly entered the home, announcing their authority and purpose while 
crossing the threshold. While the Supreme Court refused to make a bright line rule as to when 
officers may dispense with the knock and announce requirement, it repeatedly gave potential 
destruction of evidence or potential danger as an examples of what constitutes a justifiable 
exigencies. In addition the decision to forego knocking and announcing must only be based on 
the officer's reasonable suspicion. In this case it appears the officers had a reasonable suspicion 
that the defendant could have attempted to destroy evidence while the officers waited a 
reasonable amount of time outside. 
1(11 Even assuming that no exigencies existed, the Court is not obligated to suppress the 
evidence. In the state of Utah suppression of evidence "is only appropriate when conduct 
implicates a fundamental violation of rights." State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 411 (Utah App. 
1994). The fundamental interests supported by the knock and announce rule are "(1) the 
protection of an individual's private activities within his home, (2) the prevention of violence and 
physical injury to both police and occupants which may result from an unannounced police 
entry, and (3) the prevention of property damage resulting from forced entry." State v. Buck, 756 
P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988). Absent a fundamental violation of rights, suppression of evidence is 
appropriate only if the search was "conducted in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced the 
defendant." State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court defined 
substantial prejudice as "'the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive 
if the [r]ule had been followed'" and bad faith as '"evidence of intentional and deliberate 
disregard of a provision of the [r]ule.'" Id. 
|12 In State v. Ribe the Utah Appellate Court reversed and remanded the trial court's denial 
of the defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence. 876 P.2d 403. As the officers approached the 
defendant's home to execute a knock and announce search warrant, they saw the defendant 
outside of the residence. Id. at 404. Upon seeing the approaching law enforcement officers the 
defendant attempted to flee the premises but officers pursued and quickly apprehended the 
defendant. Id. One officer proceeded to the front door of the residence; the front door was open, 
except for a screen door, allowing the officer to view into the front room. Id. The officer 
testified he saw neither a person nor any controlled substance in the living room. Id. Without 
knocking but announcing he had a warrant, the officer entered the home and spotted the 
defendant's wife sitting directly to the left of the door. Id. The court held that suppression of 
evidence is "only appropriate when conduct implicates a fundamental violation of rights." Id. at 
411. 
If 13 In State v. Buck the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's Motion to A . 
Suppress when officers failed to knock and announce but the warrant did not violate the JuM 
defendant's fundamental rights. 876P.2d403. Acting on a tip from an informant, police y^i 
officers obtained a search warrant for the defendant's residence. Id. at 701. The magistrate did ' 
not grant a "no-knock" warrant, a fact that was overlooked by the officers serving the warrant/ 
Id. Officers directly entered the residence, finding it unoccupied. Id. During the search the 
defendant arrived, at which time the officers announced their authority and purpose. Id. The 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence collected because officers failed to knock and 
announce prior to entering the residence but the trial court denied the motion. Id. The Supreme 
Court of Utah affirmed the decision by holding that, because he was not home, the defendant's 
fundamental rights of privacy and prevention of violence were not violated. Id. at 701-02. In 
addition, the Court held that, where no one is present to respond to a knock and announce 
warrant, failure to knock is not a basis for suppression of evidence because the officer serving 
the warrant then can forcibly enter the residence after waiting a reasonable amount of time 
without a response. Id. at 702. 
1J14 In State v. Rowe the Supreme Court of Utah reinstated the conviction that the appellate 
court overturned on the ground that the evidence used against her was seized at night when the 
affidavit justifying the search warrant contained insufficient information to allow a nighttime 
search. 850 P.2d 427. The defendant was at the home of Stan Swickey when officers served a 
search warrant and an arrest warrant. Id. at 427. After gathering her possessions and leaving the 
premises, officers found a purse, later identified as the defendant's, that contained 
methamphetamine. Id. at 428. When the defendant went to the police station to identify her 
purse, she was arrested and subsequently convicted. Id. The Court held that where a 
fundamental violation of rights does not occur a "procedural violation requires suppression of 
evidence obtained only where it demonstrates prejudice to the defendant or a lack of good faith 
on the part of the police." Id. at 430. "In order to show prejudice, defendant must establish that 
absent the [procedural violation], 'the search would not otherwise have occurred or would not 
have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed.'" Id. (quoting U.S. v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 
74,77(8thCir.l988)). 
Ifl5 In Armijo's case dispensing with the knock and announce requirement while serving him 
did not implicate his fundamental rights. First, Armijo's right to privacy in his home was 
implicated not by the entry into the home but by the validly acquired search warrant. Next, 
Armijo scuffled with the officers after learning of their identity and purpose; hence, he 
voluntarily gave up that right by lunging at the officers in his room. Finally, similar to Buck, the 
officers had the right to forcibly enter if the defendant did not respond to the knock in a 
reasonable time. Finally, given that the defendant was unresponsive to all the announcements 
and physical prodding after the officers entered the home, it is likely he would not have 
responded within a reasonable time. Accordingly, police did not substantially implicate his 
fundamental right to prevent property damage. The only avenue left for the defendant is to 
demonstrate prejudice or lack of good faith on the part of the police officers serving the warrant. 
Nothing in the record attempts to demonstrate either that the search would not have occurred but 
for the failure to knock and announce or that the officers intentionally disregarded the rule out of 
bad faith. 
ORDER 
Tfl2 In summary, the Court: Denies Defendant Armijo's Motion to Suppress evidence. 
So ordered this Tuesday, June 08, 2004. By the Court: 
Dennis M. Fuchs 
Third District Court Judge 
